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Berge equilibria in n-person 2-strategy games
Pawe l Sawicki∗, Jaros law Pykacz†, Pawe l Bytner‡
Abstract
An algorithm for finding all Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in
n-person 2-strategy games in pure and mixed strategies is given.
KEY WORDS: Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii; n-person
2-strategy game; Berge equilibria in pure and mixed strategies
1 Introduction
The idea of a solution concept of a game that nowadays is called Berge equilibrium
(in the sense of Zhukovskii) was launched by French mathematician Claude Berge [1]
in his book The´orie ge´ne´rale des jeux a` n personnes. The idea of Berge equilibrium
is in a sense opposite to the idea of Nash equilibrium. While Nash equilibrium is
based on egoism: each player aims to maximize his own payoff, Berge equilibrium is
based on altruism: each player’s aim is to maximize payoffs of all the other players,
so when every player does so, everyone is better off.
As it was shown by Colman et al. [3], in 2-person games there is a perfect
symmetry between Nash and Berge equilibria: Nash equilibria in a game G become
Berge equilibria in a game G′ obtained from the game G by interchanging players’
payoffs, and vice versa. Actually, Colman et al. considered only equilibria in pure
strategies, but it is straightforward to see that this result refers also to equilibria in
mixed strategies. Therefore, by the historic [5] theorem which assures that in any
finite game there exists at least one Nash equilibrium – in pure or mixed strategies,
there exists also at least one Berge equilibrium in every 2-person finite game.
The situation becomes different already in the case of the simplest 3-person
games in which each player has only two pure strategies. In the MSc Thesis written
by Bytner [2] (see also Pykacz et al. [6]) an example of a 3-person 2-strategy game
with no Berge equilibria at all, neither in pure nor in mixed strategies, was given.
The literature providing algorithms for finding Berge equilibria is very scarce.
Algorithms presented in Colman et al. [3], which allow to find Berge equilibria in
n-person game by finding the common Nash equilibria in a family of associated 2-
person games, allow to find Berge equilibria in pure strategies only. Also a simple
algorithm presented in a paper by Corley and Kwain [4], although this paper is
entiteled ‘An algorithm for computing all Berge equilibria’, allows to find Berge
equilibria in pure strategies only.
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The aim of this paper is to provide an algorithm to find all Berge equilibria
in completely mixed strategies, and also Berge equilibria of a ‘mixed type’ (some
players play pure and some play mixed strategies), in n-person, 2-strategy games.
This, together with an algorithm by Corley and Kwain [4] for finding Berge equilibria
in finite games in pure strategies, yields a complete algorithm for finding all Berge
equilibria in n-person 2-strategy games. Although the obtained result is modest
since it refers to the very narrow class of games, to the best of our knowledge it is
the first algorithm for finding Berge equilibria in non-pure strategies in normal form
games involving more than two players.
2 Basic Notions and Definitions
Noncooperative finite game in normal form is a triple:
G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N〉, (1)
where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players, Si is a finite set of pure strategies
of a player i, and Ui is a function from S =
∏
i∈N Si into the set of real numbers
that describes payoffs possible to obtain by the player i. Mixed strategy of the
player i is identified with a probability distribution defined on the set Si of his pure
strategies. The set of all mixed strategies of the player i is denoted S˜i. When at
least one player chooses a completely mixed (i.e., non-pure) strategy, payoffs are
understood as suitable expected values, and the set of real-valued functions they
form, defined on S˜ =
∏
i∈N S˜i, will be denoted (U˜i)i∈N . We do not distinguish
between a game and its mixed extension, and when we write strategy we mean a
general mixed strategy, with pure strategies being special cases of mixed ones. Let
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
∏
i∈N S˜i be a strategy profile, then by s−i we denote the incomplete
strategy profile s−i = (s1, . . . si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) ∈ S˜−i =
∏
j 6=i S˜j. By a small abuse of
symbols we make an identification (si, s−i) = s.
Definition 1 A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) ∈ S˜ is a Berge equilibrium (in the
sense of Zhukovskii) of the game G if:
∀i ∈ N, ∀s−i ∈ S˜−i, U˜i(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ U˜i(s
∗). (2)
Let us compare this notion with the notion of Nash equilibrium:
Definition 2 A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) ∈ S˜ is a Nash equilibrium of the
game G if:
∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ S˜i, U˜i(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ U˜i(s
∗). (3)
By 2×2×2 game we mean 3-person game in which each player has two pure
strategies. Such games are defined by a pair of tri-matrices:
Example 1 Let us consider the following 2 × 2 × 2 game studied in [2]. Pure
strategies of the first, the second, and the third player are denoted A1, A2; B1, B2;
C1, C2, respectively.
C1 :
( B1 B2
A1 (2, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)
A2 (2, 0, 1) (1, 0, 2)
)
C2 :
( B1 B2
A1 (1, 2, 0) (0, 2, 1)
A2 (1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 2)
)
. (4)
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The left-hand matrix refers to the pure strategy C1 of the third player, while the
right-hand matrix refers to his pure strategy C2. Let us note that this game is a
very special one: None of the players has any possibility to influence his own payoff,
no matter if he uses any of his pure or mixed strategies. On the contrary, his
payoffs depend exclusively on the choices of the remaining players. This means that
every, absolutely every, strategy profile, no matter whether consisting of pure or of
completely mixed, or not completely mixed strategies, is a Nash equilibrium. In [2]
it was shown that this game has no Berge equilibrium at all, neither in pure, nor
in mixed strategies by using a specific method that will be described in a subsequent
paper. In the present paper we shall show the same using our general algorithm.
3 An algorithm for finding all Berge equilibria in
n-person 2-strategy games
To make the presented algorithm complete we shall start with reminding Corley and
Kwain [4] algorithm for finding Berge equilibria in finite games in pure strategies.
3.1 Berge equilibria in finite games in pure strategies
Corley and Kwain [4] based their algorithm on the notion of disappointment incurred
by a player choosing a specific strategy si ∈ Si.
Definition 3 The disappointment incurred by a player i choosing strategy si while
the other players choose strategies s−i is the number
di(s) = di(si, s−i) = max
t
−i∈S−i
ui(si, t−i)− ui(si, s−i). (5)
They noticed that this definition immediately yields the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The pure strategy profile s∗ is a Berge equilibrium for the game G if
and only if the disappointment di(s
∗) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
It follows from this Theorem that at least in small games the most efficient
way to find all Berge equilibria in pure strategies is to construct what Corley and
Kwain in [4] call disappointment matrix, i.e., a matrix obtained from the payoff
matrix of a game by replacing all payoffs by respective disappointments. Then Berge
equilibria in pure strategies are pure strategy profiles for which in disappontment
matrix an entry is a null vector.
It is easy to check that disappointment matrix of a game studied in Example
1 looks as follows:
C1 :
( B1 B2
A1 (0, 1, 2) (1, 1, 1)
A2 (0, 2, 1) (1, 2, 0)
)
C2 :
( B1 B2
A1 (1, 0, 2) (2, 0, 1)
A2 (1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 0)
)
. (6)
Thus, we see that this game has no Berge equilibria in pure strategies.
3
3.2 Berge equilibria in n-person 2-strategy games in com-
pletely mixed strategies
We shall explain an algorithm for finding all Berge equilibria in completely mixed
strategies in n-person 2-strategy games taking as an example 3-person 2-strategy
game. Generalization of this method to games with bigger number of players is
straightforward.
Let us denote, respectively, pure strategies of the first, the second, and the
third player by A1, A2; B1, B2; C1, C2, and let us denote the general mixed strategy
profile by s∗ = (p, q, r) ∈ S˜, where p, q, r ∈ [0, 1] are probabilities with which the
first, the second, and the third payer, respectively, chooses his first pure strategy.
Let us assume that Berge equilibrium in completely mixed startegies of such a game
is a strategy profile s∗ = (p, q, r), where p, q, r ∈ (0, 1). Let us consider the expected
payoff of the first player. Because of linearity of functions that yield expected values
of payoffs we have:
U˜1(p, q, r) = qrU˜1(p, B1, C1) + q(1− r)U˜1(p, B1, C2)
+ (1− q)rU˜1(p, B2, C1) + (1− q)(1− r)U˜1(p, B2, C2),
i.e., U˜1(p, q, r) is a convex combination of all possible payoffs to the first player when
he plays his completely mixed strategy p ∈ S˜1 while the remaining players play all
possible combinations of their pure strategies.
Because we have assumed that the strategy profile s∗ = (p, q, r) ∈ S˜ is a
Berge equilibrium, the following inequalities must be satisfied:
U˜1(p, q, r) ≥ U˜1(p, B1, C1), (7)
U˜1(p, q, r) ≥ U˜1(p, B1, C2), (8)
U˜1(p, q, r) ≥ U˜1(p, B2, C1), (9)
U˜1(p, q, r) ≥ U˜1(p, B2, C2). (10)
But when a number is a non-trivial convex combination of other numbers and at the
same time it is greater than or equal to each of them, all the considered numbers
must be equal. Therefore, the probability p must be a solution of the system of
equations:
U˜1(p, B1, C1) = U˜1(p, B1, C2) = U˜1(p, B2, C1) = U˜1(p, B2, C2). (11)
For the same reasons the probability q must be a solution of the system of equations:
U˜2(A1, q, C1) = U˜2(A1, q, C2) = U˜2(A2, q, C1) = U˜2(A2, q, C2), (12)
and the probability r must be a solution of the system of equations:
U˜3(A1, B1, r) = U˜3(A1, B2, r) = U˜3(A2, B1, r) = U˜3(A2, B2, r). (13)
Of course in the general case of n-person 2-strategy game we obtain in this
way n systems of equations, each system consisting of 2n−1 equations. Since in each
of these systems of equations there is only one unknown variable, the bigger is the
number of equations, the less probable is to find a solution. Therefore, we infere
that the existence of Berge equilibria in completely mixed strategies in such games
is rather an exception than a rule.
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Example 2 Let us consider the following 2× 2× 2 game:
C1 :
( B1 B2
A1 (7, 5, 2) (4, 2, 0)
A2 (3, 7,−4) (6, 1, 6)
)
C2 :
( B1 B2
A1 (1, 1,−3) (8, 4, 0)
A2 (9, 3, 6) (2, 3,−9)
)
. (14)
It is easy to check that the systems of equations (11) – (13) for this game look as
follows:
4p+ 3 = −8p+ 9 = −2p+ 6 = 6p+ 2, (15)
3q + 2 = −3q + 4 = 6q + 1 = 3, (16)
5r − 3 = 0 = −10r + 6 = 15r − 9, (17)
and have the following unique solution:
p = 1/2, q = 1/3, r = 3/5. (18)
Therefore, the unique Berge equilibrium of this game in completely mixed strategies
is the strategy profile s∗ = (1/2, 1/3, 3/5).
Let us now find systems of equations (11) – (13) for the game studied in
Example 1. It is easy to check that in this case these systems of equations are as
follows:
0 = 1 = 1 = 2, (19)
1 = 0 = 2 = 1, (20)
2 = 1 = 1 = 0. (21)
Since all these systems of equations are contradictory, we see that the game studied
in Example 1 has no Berge equilibria in completely mixed strategies.
Let us note that in n-person, 2-strategy games all the considered equations
are linear equations that have either none, or exactly one, or continuum of solutions,
so we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Any n-person, 2-strategy game has either none, or exactly one, or
continuum of Berge equlilibria in completely mixed strategies.
3.3 Berge equilibria of a ‘mixed type’ in n-person, 2-strategy
games
To make our paper complete, let us study now Berge equilibria of a ‘mixed type’,
i.e., such that some players play pure, while the remaining players play completely
mixed strategies. Finding such equilibria in n-person, 2-strategy games is the most
laborious task, nevertheless it is feasible. Fortunately enough, if a studied game has
no equilibrium of this type, an algorithm finishes quickly.
Any equilibrium of a ‘mixed type’ defines partition of the set of all players
N into two subsets: N = P ∪ M where the set P consists of players that play
pure strategies, and the set M consists of remaining players that play completely
mixed strategies. Of course if we are going to find all Berge equilibria of a ‘mixed
type’ we must check all possible partitions. In 3-player game there are 6 partitions,
in 4-player game there are 14 partitions, and in n-player game there are 2n − 2
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partitions. (There are 2n possibilities of choosing subset P of set N and subset M
is complementary to P in N . Therefore 2N partitions should exist, but two of them
constitute special cases considered above.) This shows how laborious this algorithm
is.
Now we shall assume the existence of strategy profile b∗ = (p∗,m∗), where
p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
k) ∈
∏
i∈P Si and m
∗ = (m∗1, m
∗
2, . . . , m
∗
n−k) ∈
∏
i∈M S˜i \ Si,
forming a ‘mixed type’ Berge equilibrium. Visibly, this can be true only if payoffs
U˜i of players in P subset are the highest possible for their given strategies (on account
of Definition 1). Moreover, as shown in subsection 3.2, payoff yielded by a given
mixed strategy profile is a convex combination of all possible payoffs. It implies –
by the same reasoning as in subsection 3.2 – that b∗ may be a Berge equilibrium
only if, for every pure strategy profile m′ in M and every player pi, payoffs U˜i for
every strategy profile (p∗,m′) are equal and maximal. Checking whether it really
happens is straightforward (disappointment matrix), although fairly strenuous.
Number of subprofiles p∗ fulfilling this condition is finite (just as number of all
subprofiles p), thus each of them may be investigated separately. On that basis we
can assume that we already have a subprofile p∗ with guaranteed maximal payoffs U˜i
for members of P subset of players, needing only to ensure that members ofM subset
will also get payoffs U˜i maximal for their strategies (this could be named Berge half-
equilibrium). Additionally, M players now take part in a somehow self-contained
game, as their payoffs rely only on their decisions. Thanks to this observation,
we are now able to find all mixed Berge subequilibria (indeed, those are not half-
equilibria, as we shall see soon) between them – exploiting the algorithm given in
subsection 3.2. If no such subequilibria exist, it becomes impossible for b∗ to be a
Berge equilibrium.
It has to be noted that listed conditions are not yet sufficient to ensure m∗
being Berge half-equilibrium, and consequently b∗ being Berge equilibrium, because
(and only because) it could happen that some change in p∗ increases the payoff U˜i
of some player in M . This possibility is easy to be confirmed or contradicted in
finite number of steps when there is single subequilibrium in M , but things become
complicated with continuum on them (as we already showed, there may be zero, one
or continuum of such equilibria).
In order to complete the algorithm by solving this case, we begin with the
observation: U˜i(mi,m−i,p
∗), for a constant value of p∗, is a linear function of
si ∈ (0, 1). It is of crucial importance that constancy of m−i is not necessary,
because – as we already assumed – subprofile m forms a Berge subequilibrium if
complementary to the considered constant subprofile p∗. Let us denote any strategy
profile containing mi as (mi,b
′
−i). Let us also denote any strategy profile composed
of mi and pure strategies of remaining players as (mi,p
′
−i). U˜i(mi,p
′
−i) is also
a linear function of si ∈ (0, 1) (and there exist 2
n−1 such functions). As we al-
ready proved, every possible payoff U˜i(mi,b
′
−i)) is a convex combination of payoffs
U˜i(mi,p
′
−i)). Therefore, U˜i(mi,m−i,p
∗) is the highest of payoffs U˜i(mi,b
′
−i)) if and
only if it is not lower than any of payoffs U˜i(mi,p
′
−i)).
However, it is actually possible to compare the linear function U˜i(mi,m−i,p
∗)
to the linear functions U˜i(mi,p
′
−i)) one by one. Every such comparison consists
of solving the linear inequality with one unknown and returns one of three results:
‘analysed function U˜i(mi,p
′
−i)) never exceeds U˜i(mi,m−i,p
∗) in (0, 1) (and, as such,
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has no influence on Berge equilibria in question)’, ‘analysed function U˜i(mi,p
′
−i))
exceeds U˜i(mi,m−i,p
∗) from mi = x onwards, resp. downwards (and, as such,
limits Berge equilibria in question to mi ∈ (0, x], resp. mi ∈ [x, 1))’ or ‘analysed
function U˜i(mi,p
′
−i)) exceeds U˜i(mi,m−i,p
∗) all over (0, 1) (and, as such, makes
the existence of Berge equilibria in partition N = P ∪M impossible)’. Having made
2n−1 such comparisons, in order to obtain a set of mi values participating in Berge
equilibria in question it is enough to take the highest of lower limits and the lowest of
upper limits. Obviously, these steps have to be repeated for every player Mi having
a continuum of strategies participating in Berge subequilibria in M . This completes
the algorithm of finding Berge equilibria in n-person 2-strategy games.
For every partition of the players’ set, the algorithm may be divided into
three relatively simple steps. Step 1 is formed by finding the appropriate subprofiles
p∗. Step 2 contains solving, for each of found subprofiles, the problem of Berge
subequilibria in M . Finally, step 3 consists of solving the aforementioned sets of
linear inequalities.
Example 3 Case study: First sportsman, Second sportsman and Trainer (FST)
game. Trainer works in a tennis club in a small town and she may choose one of
two forms of salary. In offer 1, she will get the same amount of money regardless
of results of her trainees. In offer 2, her wage will be strongly dependant on these
results. As for Sportsmen, they can choose ‘recreation’ or ‘hard work’. Hard work
always provides better payoff (in the sense of satisfaction); however, payoff resulting
from hard work is higher with determined Trainer (offer 2), while payoff resulting
from recreation is lower with determined Trainer, as then the training sessions are
far too strenuous. Finally, we have to notice that Trainer, having chosen offer 2,
prefers one devoted trainee than two, because in the latter case an immense amount
of work outweighs the higher salary. These data allow us to write the payoff matrix:
T1 :
( S1 S2
F1 (2, 2, 2) (2, 3, 2)
F2 (3, 2, 2) (3, 3, 2)
)
T2 :
( S1 S2
F1 (1, 1, 1) (1, 4, 3)
F2 (4, 1, 3) (4, 4, 2)
)
. (22)
For both Sportsmen, strategy 1 means recreational playing and strategy 2
means planning a tennis career. For Trainer, strategy 1 means taking offer 1 and
strategy 2 means taking offer 2. It is easy to notice that the trainees have no influ-
ence on each other. Having the payoff matrix, we can construct the disappointment
matrix:
T1 :
( S1 S2
F1 (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
F2 (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
)
T2 :
( S1 S2
F1 (1, 1, 2) (1, 0, 0)
F2 (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)
)
. (23)
Therefore, we see that here exists only one Berge equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. In order to find any completely mixed Berge equilibria, we have to construct
three systems of equations like in Example 2:
− p+ 3 = −3p+ 4 = −p + 3 = −3p+ 4, (24)
− q + 3 = −3q + 4 = −q + 3 = −3q + 4, (25)
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r + 1 = −r + 3 = −r + 3 = 2. (26)
One can easily check that they have no solution in (0, 1)3. Consequently, no Berge
equilibria in completely mixed strategies exist here.
Our last task is to find all ‘mixed type’ Berge equilibria. It is necessary to
consider six possible partitions of the set of players: F and S pure – T mixed; F pure
– S and T mixed; S pure – F and T mixed; F and T pure – S mixed; S and T pure
– F mixed; T pure – F and S mixed.
In the case FS–T no pure strategy of F and S gives them equal and maximal
payoff regardless of choice of T (as Trainer’s attitude always influences satisfaction
of Sportsmen). Therefore, the very first step of algorithm is enough to show that
this partition gives no Berge equilibria. The same line of reasoning excludes F–ST
and S–FT partitions.
FT–S is a bit more complicated. Step 1: the pairs of strategies (F1, T1) and
(F2, T1) give F and T payoffs not influenced by S strategy. In spite of that, only the
pair (F1, T1) ensures that these payoffs will be maximal for the chosen strategy (which
can be easily seen in the disappointment matrix: pair (F2, T1) leaves F disappointed,
as he hoped for (F2, T2)). Therefore, the algorithm continues with analysing just this
one pair. Step 2: now we have to find all Berge subequilibria between M players.
Of course, we know how to do it in the general case. Moreover, it is obvious that
every mixed strategy of S forms a Berge equilibrium in the subgame consisting only
of that player. Step 3: the last thing to be done is solving three linear inequalities to
determine the range of q (we remind that q describes the mixed strategy of S player).
The linear function of Second sportsman’s payoff for the strategy profile (F1, q, T1)
is −q+3. We have to compare it to the functions for profiles (F1, q, T2), (F2, q, T1),
(F2, q, T2). Two of these inequalities turn out redundant and the third one is:
− q + 3 ≥ −3q + 4, (27)
which gives q ≥ 0.5. Hence, the set of Berge equilibria for FT–S is (p = 1, 0.5 ≤
q < 1, r = 1). Because of full symmetry between First and Second sportsman, we
also know that the set of Berge equilibria for ST–F is (0.5 ≤ p < 1, q = 1, r = 1).
The last case is T–FS. Step 1: only strategy T1 gives T equal and maximal
payoff regardless of F and S strategies. Step 2: every pair of mixed strategies of
F and S forms a Berge subequilibrium between them, as they have no influence on
each other’s payoff (this can be also easily shown by applying the algorithm given in
subsection 3.2). Step 3: the linear functions of First and Second sportsman’s payoffs
for the strategy profile (p, q, T1) are −p + 3 and −q + 3. We have to compare them
to the functions for the profile (p, q, T2):
− p+ 3 ≥ −3p+ 4;−q + 3 ≥ −3q + 4, (28)
which gives p, q ≥ 0.5. Hence, the set of Berge equilibria for T–FS is (0.5 ≤ p <
1, 0.5 ≤ q < 1, r = 1).
Summarizing the example, the set of all Berge equilibria in the FST game is
(p ≥ 0.5, q ≥ 0.5, r = 1).
The interesting thing is that the set of all Nash equilibria in the FST game
is (p = 0, q = 0) (with no limits on r). The payoffs given by Berge equilibria are
U˜1, U˜2 ∈ [2, 2.5], U˜3 = 2, whereas the payoffs given by Nash equilibria are (4, 4, 2).
The psychological reasoning behind the idea of Berge equilibrium, however, is getting
8
the most one could hope for with his strategy (avoiding disappointment) rather than
seeking for the highest payoff.
Example 4 For the sake of completeness, let us also finish the analysis of the game
from Example 1. We have already solved cases with only pure strategies or only
mixed strategies. Therefore, the six remaining cases are partitions AB–C, AC–B,
BC–A, A–BC, B–AC, C–BA. It is instantly visible, however, that the consideration
of each of these cases ends on step 1, because in all the configurations every player’s
payoff is dependant on decisions of his both rivals. This proves that this game has
no Berge equilibria at all.
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